太阳城集团国际娱乐城-菲律宾澳门太阳城集团骰宝_百家乐影院_sp全讯网新2 (中国)·官方网站

搜索
學術
講座

清華大學肖勇波教授學術講座

2024.03.11 瀏覽量:

主講人 : 肖勇波

Donations to the "bottom of the pyramid" in less developed areas have been widely adopted by manufacturers and retailers involved in the supply chain to exercise corporate social responsibility efficiently. In addition to generating social benefits (i.e., donation value), donations can also contribute to building a brand's reputation and expanding its customer  , as today's consumers are increasingly socially responsible. This study addresses the question of whether a firm should engage in direct donations or opt for a "free ride" by leveraging other supply chain members' donation initiatives to improve operational performance. Specifically, we consider a socially responsible supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, who seek to maximize his/her mixed  ive, i.e., a weighted sum of their respective profit and donation value. Both firms consider donation as a means of managing demand, which depends on the total donation amount. Using a Stackelberg game, we study the interactive donation and inventory decisions across the supply chain. We show that in equilibrium, only one firm donates and the other free rides. To encourage both firms to participate in donation and enhance their overall performance, including profitability and donation value, we consider a collaborative donation approach. Specifically, one firm could offer monetary incentives to its supply chain partner in the form of price discounts or refunds, contingent upon the partner making charitable donations. Such a collaborative donation approach can always benefit the firm offering the monetary incentives, while paradoxically it may harm its supply chain partner (who receives the discounts or refunds). Finally, we propose a new type of contract to coordinate the supply chain and achieve Pareto improvement for both firms.


主講人簡介:

肖勇波,清華大學經濟管理學院管理科學與工程系長聘正教授。2000年獲清華大學管理信息系統學士學位,2006年獲清華大學管理科學與工程碩士和博士學位,2006~2008清華大學經濟管理學院應用經濟學博士后。擔任國際學術期刊《Naval Research Logistics》的副主編和《Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering》的執行編輯;擔任《中國管理科學》、《系統工程理論與實踐》、《系統管理學報》等國內期刊的編委。研究論文入選2021年度F5000中國精品科技期刊頂尖學術論文,撰寫的建言獻策報告被全國政協、教育部、北京市政協、民進中央、新華社采納。主要研究領域包括收益與定價管理、運營與供應鏈管理等,主持了多項國家自然科學基金項目(包括青年、面上、重點項目、重大項目等),學術論文發表在Operations Research、Production and Operations Management、IIE Transactions、Decision Sciences、Naval Research Logistics等國際學術期刊以及《系統工程理論與實踐》、《中國管理科學》、《管理科學學報》等國內學術刊物上。長期講授“運籌學”“數據、模型與決策”“運營管理”等課程。

編輯:曹蔚

責編:韋麗

红9百家乐的玩法技巧和规则| 百家乐官网百胜注码法| 皇冠百家乐的玩法技巧和规则| 大发888 娱乐平台| 在线百家乐官网电脑| 临汾玩百家乐官网的人在那里找| 大发百家乐官网现金| 百家乐官网赌场技巧大全| 至富百家乐官网的玩法技巧和规则| 大发888真人网址的微博| 百家乐官网都是什么人玩的| 劳力士百家乐的玩法技巧和规则| 百家乐免费试玩| 百家乐游戏算牌| 大发888 网站被攻击了| 电脑百家乐的玩法技巧和规则 | 鼎尊国际娱乐| 伯爵百家乐官网娱乐| 太阳城宾馆| 百家乐官网娱乐送白菜| 百家乐官网庄闲和收益| 大发888娱乐城动态| 利来国际娱乐网| 开百家乐官网骗人吗| 百家乐官网第三张规则| 百家乐官网百博亚洲| 德州扑克单机版下载| 联合百家乐的玩法技巧和规则| 旺财转运24妙法| 射阳县| 百家乐必赢| 威尼斯人娱乐城真人百家乐| 闲和庄百家乐官网的玩法技巧和规则| 德州扑克庄家| 百家乐娱乐城博彩正网| 百家乐官网代理在线游戏可信吗网上哪家平台信誉好安全 | 百家乐官网谋略| 大发888官方 黄埔网| 噢门百家乐玩法| 三公百家乐官网在线哪里可以玩| 吉木萨尔县|